(WARSAW) – The Kremlin is actively promoting the narrative of Russophobia as a strategic propaganda tool to justify its aggression, control its population, and deter international opposition, according to an analysis by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW).
The analysis outlines three central questions regarding the concept of Russophobia: whether Russia is genuinely hated, why its citizens struggle to accept valid criticism, and whether the Kremlin actively fosters a belief in this phenomenon among its people. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the internal message in Russia has increasingly been one of a “besieged fortress,” with an official list of “unfriendly countries and territories.” This list includes unexpected entries such as neutral Switzerland, Micronesia, and Taiwan, which Russia does not even recognise as a state.
This list serves several purposes. It acts as a bureaucratic mechanism for automatic retaliation against states that join sanctions regimes. It also functions as a warning and a tool of deterrence, signalling to other nations that any hostile action will result in legal and economic consequences, such as difficulties in trade. Furthermore, the list is used for domestic consumption, communicating to Russian society that the government is acting decisively to protect national interests.
The OSW analysis contrasts this with the United States, noting that while anti-Americanism exists, the US government rarely promotes a narrative of “Americanophobia.” This difference is attributed to a psychological distinction: Americans have an innate desire to be popular, whereas Russian propaganda resonates with a public conviction that the world is a hostile “jungle” where having enemies is normal.
The claim of widespread Western hatred towards Russia is undermined by the success of independent Russian culture in the West. Anti-war and anti-regime artists, such as documentary filmmaker Pavl Talankin who won an Oscar, face no barriers to presenting their work. This, OSW argues, unmasks the lie that Russians should not travel to the West.
The Kremlin, however, instrumentalises culture by providing platforms to artists and athletes who actively support its aggressive policies, including those who have performed in occupied Ukrainian territories or are former members of the Russian armed forces. Attempts to restrict these individuals are then falsely labelled as Russophobia or cancel culture.
Furthermore, Russian propaganda attempts to portray its enemies as a minority, despite clear evidence to the contrary. At the United Nations General Assembly, resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine have passed with an overwhelming majority. The long list of perceived enemies is a reflection of Russia’s global imperial ambitions, which are described as irrational.
The analysis suggests it is more accurate to speak of “Westernophobia” promoted by the Kremlin than of Russophobia. It is entirely rational for Europe to be afraid of Russia, as Putin’s policies have created the biggest risk to the continent since the Second World War. The Kremlin wants to tarnish its critics to make Russians fear the very countries trying to rein in its aggressive ambitions.
This propaganda has been partly successful. Many Russians now believe the negative view of their country from Western states is undeserved and unchangeable, and that the best they can hope for is to inspire fear, which they believe will lead to respect. This has resulted in a negative national identity based on contradiction and opposition to a perceived enemy, as the government cannot offer a positive vision to unite the country.
Historical memory has also been weaponised. The memory of victory over Nazism in the Great Patriotic War is being twisted into an aggressive anti-Western narrative. The Kremlin now claims Russia is again fighting Nazis, referring to Ukrainians and the liberal democracies supporting them. The 9th May commemorations have become a moment of “hate towards the West,” based on a comparison between the current conflict and the Second World War. This narrative deliberately omits the Soviet Union’s collaboration with Nazi Germany and whitewashes Russia’s imperial history, promoting a false image of a nation that has always been good and victimised.
The Russophobia narrative is also used to discredit domestic opposition. Critics of the regime are presented as traitors and lackeys of external enemies. This fits into what OSW describes as an intentional strategy of control by the Kremlin, part of a neo-totalitarian project to eliminate pluralism and rational debate. Language is used to restrict discourse, forcing citizens to be either friends or foes. This strategy aims to convince the Russian public they have powerful enemies, making them more tolerant of their “protector.”
According to survey data, however, it is difficult to gauge true public opinion in Russia. Around 95% of Russians refuse to answer survey questions about their own opinions, a sign of self-censorship caused by fear of government repression. While the results of opinion polls are unreliable, they do show trends and can track how quickly propaganda narratives can change public evaluations.
The analysis notes a difference between the average Russian, who is more pragmatic, and the political elite. The elite are described as being upset with the West but feeling they have no way out, being “stuck with Putin,” who treats them arbitrarily. The Kremlin’s strategy of isolation is premeditated, as it is only in isolation that it can attempt to totally control Russians and prevent unrest.
The ultimate goal is to justify the need for a geopolitical buffer zone, which Russia claims is essential for its security. As the analysis puts it, “Russia only feels safe when everyone else feels threatened.” This brings the focus to Ukraine, which only appeared on Russia’s list of enemies in March 2022, after the full-scale invasion. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this is not a war but a “special military operation.”
The enemy is not the Ukrainian nation but its “evil” government, which Russia claims is controlled by the West. This narrative allows Russia to portray itself as only responding defensively to hostile acts by Ukraine, such as sanctions. The decision to break all norms of international law in 2014 was justified by the narrative that Ukraine had become an “unfriendly” state by wanting to break free from its dependence on Russia. For Russia, this makes Ukraine a hostile state, and “the law does not apply to Russia’s enemies.”
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