(KYIV) – Russia is spending approximately 59 billion rubles ($680 million, £530 million) per day on its war in Ukraine, even as its forces slowly lose ground and its aviation fleet suffers mounting losses, according to an analysis by German and Russian economist Yanis Kluga.
The figure covers the cost of holding positions in Ukraine rather than gaining territory. In the first half of 2026, the Russian war machine spent 10.6 trillion rubles ($106 billion, £82 billion) on military and arms production, representing 43.8 percent of the entire state budget. That amounts to around 1.78 trillion rubles per month, 59 billion rubles per day, and 2.5 billion rubles every hour.
Russia had announced stable or even declining expenditures for 2026. Instead, spending has increased by 30 per cent compared to the previous year and is more than five times as much as in 2021. If this pace continues, arms expenditures could reach over 9 per cent of GDP by December, a new record in Russia’s post-Soviet history.
Meanwhile, on the Lyman front in eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have conducted a successful but slow localised counteroffensive. After four months, the Third Army Corps managed to cut the Russian salient north of Lyman and liberate more than 200 square kilometres. This is one of Ukraine’s most important victories in 2026 and will delay any offensive in northern Donbas.
According to an analysis by Clement Molin, the salient had been the base for a potential Russian offensive on Lyman, which could have allowed further advances towards Izium and Sloviansk and threatened the northern supply road to Donbas. The area was fought over in May 2022, September 2022, and May 2025, when Russia managed to capture critical Ukrainian positions after two years of heavy losses.
The operation was conducted with good operational security, with barely any comments on the situation and no media attention. Russian units in the area were weak, and the 20th Combined Arms Army had no reserve to throw in. The Ukrainian advance was mechanised, using armoured vehicles working together with concentrated jamming capabilities. Without the jammers, they would be dead. With very strong jammers, they work.
The speed of the Ukrainian advance can be mapped by the craters of Russian guided aerial bombs from June, July, August, and September. The wave of craters advances toward the Russian side, indicating that Ukrainians are liberating more land and Russians are not bombing their own positions. It took about four months.
A small area remains where Russian units could still be under some control and are effectively cut off by drones or Ukrainian units. This is not a massive force. There could be a few hundred fighters trapped, some of whom could escape or surrender. This is a localised battle, not the thousands that some pro-Ukrainian bloggers claim.
The counteroffensive pushes the Russians back by more than a year and delays the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s deadlines for occupying all of Donbas. General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, has reportedly asked Putin for more time, seeking to move the deadline for fully capturing the Donetsk region from the end of 2026 to 31st March 2027. This conversation allegedly took place before Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited Moscow.
These deadlines have been postponed every six months since 2022 and serve more as political theatre and pressure on the Russian leadership than as meaningful military objectives. In 2026, Russia will definitely not occupy all of Donetsk region.
In the Mediterranean, Ukrainian forces are conducting anti-shipping strikes against Russian-linked logistics approximately 1,600 kilometres from Ukraine’s coast. According to Russian military blogger Rybar, the Ukrainian armed forces are no longer confined to their own shores. Three ships, Lady Maria, Arctic Metagas, and Kendil, were all hit in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. The strikes and drones possibly came from northern Libya, indicating that Ukraine now has military bases away from its own country and can threaten Russians in the Mediterranean.
Russian aviation losses continue to mount, with accidents accounting for more planes and helicopters than Ukrainian strikes. On 7th September 2026, two Su-35 fighters collided in the Kursk region, resulting in one pilot killed and another wounded. Three months ago, a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber crashed. This aircraft is no longer in production and cannot be replaced.
In the first week of September alone, Russia lost eight aircraft in four days. On 4th September, at Sochi International Airport in Adler, a Ka-52, Mi-28, and Mi-8 were destroyed. On 7th September, at Taganrog Central Air Base in Rostov region, a Mi-8 was destroyed and a Mi-25 damaged. On the same day, two Su-35s collided in the Kursk region. Also on 7th September, at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, a Su-24 was destroyed by a Ukrainian drone.
In July, a Tu-95 strategic bomber stationed at Engels-2 air base in Saratov region was destroyed by Ukrainian long-range drones 800 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. Satellite imagery showed one Tu-95 with its tail cut off and another damaged. On 4th August, a Tu-95 dropped its entire tail after a Ukrainian drone strike. On 28th August, another Tu-95 was struck at Engels-2, with damage to the fuselage and right wing. This was the second Tu-95 hit at Engels-2 in a month and a half.
These aircraft are over 60 years old, no longer in production, and have no spare parts. Once damaged, they are effectively out of action for the rest of their service lives. Russia cannot replace them.
Russian aviation has been unable to use its air force effectively because Ukrainian air defences have shot its aircraft out of the sky. Fighter bombers now release guided bombs 50 kilometres before the front line and turn back. Tu-95s and Tu-22s are used to bombard Ukrainian civilians with cruise missiles. Even with such minimal use, Russia continues to lose aviation assets to accidents and cheap Ukrainian drones.
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