(BRUSSELS) – European Union member states are expected to spend €454 billion (£388 billion, $493 billion) on defence this year, yet more than a third of that expenditure is flowing to American contractors, raising urgent questions about whether rearmament is delivering genuine security independence or merely reinforcing dependence on Washington.
The figures, discussed in a DW News podcast episode of The Dip published on 16th August 2026, reveal that only 53 percent of EU defence spending remains within Europe. More than a third goes to United States systems, with the proportion rising to nearly two thirds in the aerospace sector.
The dilemma is stark. France and Germany’s joint fighter jet programme has stalled after the companies involved failed to reach agreement. Berlin is now considering purchasing additional American F-35 aircraft to bridge the gap. The stated aim of the expenditure is greater European autonomy, but supply gaps are sending governments back to US contractors, binding them to American software, spare parts and political decisions.
Security researcher Linus Terhorst, speaking from London, outlined the multiple dimensions of European dependence. The first is the substantial American military presence on the continent, including troops, bases and capabilities within the NATO framework that European allies rely upon when planning for conflict scenarios.
Beyond hard military capability, Terhorst identified an industrial dimension. Numerous products, intellectual property and weapon systems are developed in the United States and sold to European allies. The F-35 is the most recognisable example, but much of the digital infrastructure and command and control systems used by NATO allies in Europe are also American.
A third element is the broader defence ecosystem and the intelligence it generates. European security agencies rely heavily on American assets, particularly space based imagery. “If you look at the amount of space based generated imagery, a lot of that is American,” Terhorst said.
Ian Lesser, speaking from Brussels, noted that most defence budgets globally are consumed by personnel and maintenance costs. However, he pointed to Belgium as an example of the procurement dilemma. The country has purchased F-35 fighter jets, an extremely expensive system, partly because of co-production benefits including technological development, employment and infrastructure.
Yet Lesser questioned whether Belgium would choose the F-35 based purely on its own defence requirements. “It probably would come to a different conclusion,” he said, explaining that the purchase also allows Belgium to participate in NATO operations further afield.
The capability gaps Europe must fill include precision ammunition capable of striking deep into enemy territory. Terhorst explained that Germany’s Taurus missile is an airborne cruise missile with a range of around 500 kilometres, while the American Tomahawk can be ground launched from vehicles, a system known as Typhon that does not currently exist in Europe.
Germany’s decision to purchase Tomahawk missiles stems from this gap in indigenous European capability to disrupt command, control and supply lines behind enemy lines. Such systems are under development in Europe but remain expensive and require difficult negotiations over work sharing, job creation and intellectual property ownership.
These are precisely the questions that disrupted the FCAS programme, the German, French and Spanish plan to build a new fighter jet. Terhorst said such disputes “tend to disrupt quite a lot of European joint projects, which is why we often find ourselves a little bit behind.”
The strategic context has shifted dramatically from the post-Cold War period. Lesser, who served on the US State Department’s policy planning staff in the mid-1990s, contrasted the “relatively positive transatlantic relationship” of that era with today’s conditions of “much greater uncertainty and much greater stress and a very different rhetoric across the Atlantic.”
He predicted a more European NATO in the future, though not one without the United States. “I think we’re definitely headed towards a more European NATO,” Lesser said. “The United States probably is going to be doing less in European security in the future unless something dramatic happens.”
The failure to aggregate demand across European nations remains a fundamental obstacle. Terhorst said the strong preference for national products means companies must be cautious about investing in additional production capacity, as they might end up with capacity in the wrong country that cannot be sold elsewhere.
“One of the biggest challenges we face today in Europe is the failure to aggregate demand and therefore giving industry a clear demand signal about how it can invest, where it can invest, which kind of products and which kind of production capacity makes sense for the next 10, 20 years,” he said.
Lesser observed that Europeans appear more comfortable discussing defence as industrial policy rather than as strategic policy. He noted a “much less advanced debate about what the strategy should be” and questioned whether societies are genuinely willing to fight and for what purposes.
The nuclear dimension adds further complexity. The American nuclear umbrella in Europe has historically required American forces on the ground as a trip wire. “If that trip wire goes away or it becomes too small, can you still count on this nuclear umbrella even if the United States is willing to provide it?” Lesser asked.
Concerns about American reliability extend to the possibility of kill switches embedded in American systems, which could theoretically allow Washington to disable access to data and maintenance. Lesser said he does not think such action is likely, but acknowledged that people are increasingly worried about it.
Modern warfare is also evolving beyond conventional conflict. The podcast discussion referenced a drone incident at Leipzig airport involving a Ukrainian aircraft, highlighting how sabotage and hybrid warfare present new challenges that Europe is still working to understand.
Terhorst outlined the worst case scenario: a situation where the United States is militarily active elsewhere and cannot commit to helping Europe if it is attacked. “If such an attack then happens, we find ourselves without the help in terms of troops, in terms of technology, in terms of intelligence that we are used to operate with in conjunction with the Americans.”
He said such a scenario would not necessarily make Europe “hugely inferior” to likely adversaries, but would make any fight significantly harder.
Lesser maintained that NATO would hold under attack, while noting that Article 5 is not automatic but rather a political decision. “What allies actually feel about each other and feel about the threat that are out there matter,” he said.
He identified a further concern: not deliberate aggression but incidents going wrong. Escalation chains could develop from events in the Black Sea, the Baltic or elsewhere, while simultaneous crises involving China in Asia could draw American attention away from Europe.
“Sometimes these things can come together,” Lesser said. “I think that’s what I would worry about: the chances of things simply going wrong.”
The podcast concluded with both researchers acknowledging the complexity of the shifting security landscape and the difficult choices facing European governments as they attempt to balance rearmament, industrial policy and strategic independence.
The discussion was broadcast on DW News’ The Dip podcast, which examines money, power and consequences in global affairs.
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