(MOSCOW) – The Kremlin is grappling with the logistical and political challenges of potentially mobilising hundreds of thousands of soldiers for its war in Ukraine, with questions mounting over whether the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will authorise a new wave of conscription.
Most commentary has focused on whether Putin will pull the trigger, with attention on potential Russian provocations against a NATO country to facilitate the process. However, the mechanics of such an undertaking present formidable obstacles that influence the decision itself.
The legal framework for mobilisation is already in place. The fall 2022 mobilisation procedure contains no sunset provision, allowing the Kremlin to return to it repeatedly. A classified paragraph is speculated to contain an upper bound on the number of soldiers who could be mobilised, though this figure is unknown. It could be as low as 300,000, the number used by the Ministry of Defence at the time, or laughably large, exceeding one million.
If the latter, Russia could continue using this law for decades without modification. The Kremlin has been laying groundwork for mobilisation, which partly explains Ukrainian suspicions that the threat is genuine. Many who were supposed to deploy to Ukraine in 2022 vanished, fleeing the country or retreating to rural areas.
Russia has since improved its systems, with summons now issued electronically. Employers must report service eligible employees, and border guards can check databases to prevent individuals from leaving the country. This system was implemented for twice annual conscription call ups, which are a normal part of Russian defence procedures and not connected to Ukraine.
More telling is the groundwork laid for the initial onboarding of mobilised soldiers. Last spring, eligible reservists were summoned for verification procedures, which included providing a reporting location should mobilisation come into effect. The real potential bottleneck will be training infrastructure, with questions over whether Russia can handle that many soldiers simultaneously.
The established minimum Russia could handle is about 190,000, reflecting roughly 30,000 contracts per month processed for Ukraine plus 160,000 ordinary conscripts, the largest class since 2022. Conceivably, Russia could redirect this infrastructure toward mobilised call ups, affecting the timing of standard conscription training, likely delaying it for months. The next window for conscripts to report begins on 1st October.
There is less certainty on maximum capacity. Since 2022, the Kremlin has expanded training capacity, building new centres and reopening shuttered ones. Assuming these are ready, the bottleneck shifts to whether Russia has enough qualified instructors, requiring pulling NCOs with recent combat experience from the frontlines. Training for war in 2026 differs vastly from 2022. Mobilised Russians are supposed to have prior military experience from conscript service. In 2022, battlefields resembled what people expected in 2010, with armoured divisions as primary units of force projection. Drones complicated affairs but had not yet dominated. By 2026, mobilised soldiers need a complete reset in combat mentality, meaning throughput at whatever facilities Russia has will be low.
The obvious choice is a one time mobilisation, issuing all summons at once and processing the resulting chaos. A 500,000 person call up would represent about two thirds of one percent of the Russian labour force. This might not sound significant, but economies cannot absorb such losses, not when one percent of the labour force is already in Ukraine, not when the country is near full employment, and not when untold numbers will dodge summons despite Kremlin efforts.
Politically, the shock could be explosive. In 2022, it was reasonable for the average Russian not to understand the realities of the war. In 2026, it is no longer reasonable, and the situation has worsened for Russians. This remains the central deterrent for Putin, which is why the Kremlin is creating political excuses to mobilise. If enough call ups are processed simultaneously, the Kremlin gets maximum impact, sending training overages to frontlines immediately to plug holes where Ukraine is on the offensive.
An overwhelming force could then be deployed two months later to make progress, instead of meandering as has been the case for six months. The political shock could be ridden out, with Russians whose numbers were not called forming an expectation of luck and returning to civilian life. Family members would remain concerned, but mass protests pre-empting personal deployment would be avoided.
Mobilising in waves flips the benefits and concerns. This would be easier on processing, and if known minimum training capacity is all Russia has, the Kremlin has little choice. A minimum of two waves would be needed to reach hypothesised numbers, likely three for upper estimates. Everyone would go to the frontlines with a fighting chance. Political and economic shocks would be less severe. Businesses would notice 100,000 people leaving the labour force each month for about half a year, but the segmented timeline allows adjustment.
Politically, half a million Russian men would not simultaneously weigh protesting versus meeting their fate in Ukraine. However, those whose numbers were not called would think long and hard about next steps. Border officials would have no reason to stop the remainder from taking a vacation to Turkey, where the average Alexanders and median Mikhails might decide to extend their stay. The Kremlin would effectively invite an exodus, making the next wave more difficult.
Another question concerns executing mobilisation secretly. The 2022 law remains in effect, so the Kremlin could continue previous mobilisation without a video address or press releases. However, there is a difference between doing something in secret and keeping it secret. Bringing 500,000 men into enrolment centres without someone knowing is impractical. Low level recruitment officers would facilitate the process, but once they know, everyone knows. Even if everyone reports for routine processing, half a million military aged males cannot disappear overnight without someone connecting the dots.
A rolling secret effort, with a slow trickle beamed to Ukraine, would supplement the 30,000 entering on voluntary contracts. But this sustains recruitment incentives, and the point is to lower the Kremlin’s financial burden. A sudden influx of soldiers putting pressure on Ukraine would not materialise. The longer secret mobilisation continues, the higher the risk someone realises, triggering social panic. Russians would try to leave, and the Kremlin would not receive the benefit of a large initial cohort.
Perhaps the best approach is waiting for the 1st October window for regularly conscripted soldiers to report, conveniently a couple of weeks after elections end. This would bring about 130,000 soldiers without initial suspicion. They would go through usual procedures, then be put on a bus, and find themselves in Ukraine. The downside is that conscripted soldiers do not absolve the Kremlin of political problems.
This pool expects their duty is to protect Russia, classic Russia, not what laws being signed now say Russia consists of. When Ukraine invaded Kursk, part of Russia proper, the Kremlin tried to have conscripted soldiers defend the oblast. They refused, understanding this was an extension of the Ukraine war, forcing the Kremlin to redeploy contract soldiers and North Korean soldiers, because North Korean soldiers participating in a land war in Europe was on everyone’s bingo cards for this decade. The same mobilisation problems remain, with the only difference being 130,000 moved before alarm bells rang.
The number could be fudged to 200,000 without notice, then 50,000 more from a special mobilisation operation halfway through training. Long run fallout would still apply. Teenagers and 20 somethings would be sent to Ukraine, an age range previously avoided for fear of worsening demographic decline. Public trust in the regular conscription system, which miraculously survived the war, would be burned.
Every new cohort would question whether they are being sent to Ukraine, causing long run draft avoidance. For all the effort, Ukraine would likely not be confused. Everything from the war over five years indicates the United States is still reading the Kremlin’s emails. Such a plan evading Western intelligence is unreasonable, so surprising Ukraine with hundreds of thousands more to send through the grinder offers no benefit.
The final possibility is no new mobilisation at all. Mobilisation is not yet publicly known Kremlin policy. It is a concern inside Ukraine and a real possibility, but not a reality. Yet. New attention to mobilisation may successfully deter the Kremlin. Kremlin officials denying mobilisation rumours suggests pulling one over on the Russian public will not be easy. The path of least resistance is to keep paying market wages and reinforce existing frontline forces by paying the necessary bill, even if government coffers are not looking particularly flush.
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